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In this paper we argue that compositionality alone isn't 
sufficient to derive systematicity clauses for meanings 
(meaning = truth-functional content of an utterance). In a 
seminal paper by Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) the 
'systematicity' of adjectival modification has been derived 
from the stipulation that the syntactic operation of 
modification relates to the semantic operation of 
conjunction.  We argue that this assumption fails already in 
the case of so-called 'absolute' adjectives. For instance, in 
order to determine the truth-functional content of a phrase 
like red apple it must be specified which parts of the apple 
are red, and this cannot be described by conjoining the 
adjective with the noun meaning.  
 Our answer to this and related puzzles is to take the 
meaning of the adjective as a function that applies to the 
meaning of the noun. Though compositional in the formal 
sense, this operation fails to predict any kind of 
systematicity for adjectival modification. In order to 
account for certain regularities we have to pose restrictions 
on the set of possible functions that count as adjective 
meanings. We are able to pose the right restrictions using a 
connectionist network that respects the role of encyclopedic 
knowledge. We argue that this model also is able to derive 
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Frege on Compositionality and Contextuality  
For many semanticists, logicians and (generative) linguists 
the principle of compositionality of meaning has 
immediate appeal because it promises to have important 
empirical consequences that relate to the intuitive notion of 
systematicity: the ability to grasp clusters of new thoughts 
supposed some appropriate seed is given.1 In this 
connection, Frege (1923) can be cited as it provides a clear 
illustration of the attitude under discussion: 
It is astonishing what language can do. With a few 
syllables it can express an incalculable number of 
thoughts, so that even a thought grasped by a 
terrestrial being for the first time can be put into a 
form of words which will be understood by someone 
to whom the thought is entirely new. This would be 
impossible, were we not able to distinguish parts in 
the thoughts corresponding to the parts of a sentence, 
so that the structure of the sentence serves as the 
image of the structure of the thoughts (Frege (1923), 
translated by Geach and Stoothoff) 
As Janssen (1997) points out, compositionality requires (a) 
that words in isolation have a meaning and (b) that from 
these meanings the meaning of a compound can be built. 
Interestingly, Frege did not believe in the idea of isolated 
word meaning when he wrote his Grundlagen der 
Mathematik: "One should ask for the meaning of a word 
only in the context of a sentence, and not in isolation" 
                                                 
1 To be sure, our intuitive understanding of systematicity also includes 
significant effects of stochastic correlations.  
(Frege, 1884, p. x). Following Janssen, this formulation of 
contextuality seems to disallow the meaning of words in 
isolation and is therefore incompatible with composit-
ionality.  
 Though it is possible to reconcile contextuality and 
compositionality (Blutner, Hendriks, & de Hoop, 2003; 
Dummett, 1973) if a broad view of compositionality is 
taken, one important question remains: Assuming a proper 
way of filling in the compositionality schema, is it possible 
then to understand the regularities that lead to the 
clustering effect described above? The answer we will give 
is negative: compositionality alone is not sufficient. We 
need additional structural assumptions which can be 
abstracted from the nature of encyclopedic knowledge as 
represented in connectionist networks. This conclusion has 
important consequences for cognitive architecture. In 
order to account for the systematic nature of cognition it's 
not sufficient to stipulate a formal principle of compositio-
nality. Moreover, general assumptions about connectionist 
networks are needed to overcome the shortcomings of 
classical architecture. 
Compositionality versus Systematicity 
The principle of compositionality of meaning can be seen 
as a formal schema. Usually, it is formulated as follows: 
The meaning of a compound expression is a function of 
the meanings of its parts (and of the syntactic rule by 
which they are combined). Its modern mathematical 
modeling is in terms of Universal Algebra where the 
compositionality relates to stating a homomorphism from 
the syntactic (term) algebra to the algebra of meanings. As 
Janssen (1997) points out, the principle of compositional-
ity should not be considered an empirically verifiable 
restriction but a methodological principle that helps to find 
a proper design for syntax and semantics.  
 Close to the naïve conception of compositionality is that 
the syntactic algebra constitutes strings of words with the 
syntactic rule as rule of concatenation. Informally this 
constitutes a "way of linking or ordering successive 
constituents without altering them in any way as it forms 
the compound expression." (van Gelder, 1990). However, 
there are more powerful rules than just concatenation. Van 
Gelder (1990) collectively refers to such systems as 
constituting functional compositionality. He points out that 
the requisites of functional compositionality  can be 
obtained whenever there are general, effective, and reliable 
processes for (a) producing an expression given its 
constituents, and (b) decomposing the expression back into 
those constituents. 
 In contrast to compositionality the notion of 
systematicity is much less clear. While some initial ideas 
can be traced back to Frege (see the above quote), the term 
and empirical hypothesis was introduced in Fodor & 
Pylyshyn (1988). Unfortunately, these authors didn't give a 
precise definition of the concept, or even an adequate 
description of the empirical phenomenon under discussion. 
In their discussion of systematicity, van Gelder & 
Niklasson (1994) offered the following scheme as a first 
approximation: 
Systematicity according to Fodor & Pylyshyn (SFP): 
All cognitive systems (humans and other animals) are 
systematic, i.e., are such that their ability to do some 
things of a given cognitive type (including at least 
"thinking a thought" and making an inference) is 
intrinsically  connected with their ability to do other, 
structurally related things of that type. (van Gelder & 
Niklasson, 1994) 
Obviously, it has to be clarified what precisely counts as a 
structurally related thing (performance) for a given thing 
(performance) of a certain cognitive type in order to 
transmute this scheme into an empirical hypothesis. To be 
sure, if we restrict ourselves to particular domains, then it 
isn't difficult to fill out the scheme appropriately, and we 
can check whether the emerging hypothesis is a 
consequence of the principle of compositionality (and, 
perhaps, other classical assumptions) or not.  
 There is a large class of restricting adjectives that denote 
gradable properties, such as tall, high, long, short, quick, 
intelligent. It is well known that the applicability 
conditions of these adjectives  vary depending upon the 
type of object to which they apply. What is high for a chair 
is not high for a tower and what is clever for a young child 
is not clever for an adult. On the other hand, there is the 
much more restricted class of so-called 'absolute' 
adjectives (such as red, blue, spherical, quadratic, …) for 
which it's claimed that their semantic values don't depend 
on the type of object to which they apply. Fodor & 
Pylyshyn (1988) consider the phenomenon of adjectival 
modification in connection with absolute adjectives and 
assume that the syntactical form ‘(adjective noun)N’ has 
the semantic force of a conjunction. In this case, the 
phenomenon of systematicity relates to clauses of the 
following kind:  
(1) When an agent understands the expressions brown 
triangle and black square, she understands the 
expressions brown square and black triangle as well.2 
According to Fodor & Pylyshyn, the systematicity of 
linguistic competence derives from the fact that the 
syntactic operation of modification relates to the semantic 
operation of conjunction (or intersection) in the discussed 
cases. Although they don't make any attempt to explicate 
this derivation, the underlying key ideas are clear enough.  
 First, a word of clarification is in order to avoid mis-
understandings. The claim is not that systematicity gives us 
viable restrictions on the corresponding extensions of 
natural language expressions. For instance, if we know the 
extensions of BROWN∩TRIANGLE and BLACK∩SQUARE, 
                                                 
2  We are not sure about the scope of systematicity clauses Fodor and 
Pylyshyn would generally permit. Szabó (2004) provides examples where 
our intuitions are more than a bit hazy: "But do all who understand within 
an hour and without a watch also understand within a watch and without 
an hour? And do all who understand halfway closed and firmly believed 
also understand halfway believed and firmly closed?". The question then 
is what kind of arguments permits or forbids such examples. In our view it 
has to do with the acquisition of encyclopedic knowledge. 
then its normally not possible to derive the extensions of 
BROWN∩SQUARE and  BLACK∩TRIANGLE3.  
 According to the classical view, the phrase 'understand-
ing natural language expressions' means more than just 
fixing a denotation. The following illustration may help to 
elucidate the point. We 'understand' a phrase as brown 
triangle if (i) we are able to grasp the corresponding 
conceptual representation (BROWN∩TRIANGLE), (ii) the 
corresponding conceptual components have an known 
truth functional impact4 (i.e. they can be used to calculate 
the actual extensions if the relevant situational parameters 
are given), (iii) With the help of the involved logical 
operators it is possible to determine the truth conditions of 
the whole phrase under discussion.  
 Now we are ready to derive systematicity clauses such 
as (1) from the classical assumptions: When an agent 
understands the expressions brown triangle and black 
square, then she is able to construct (via compositionality) 
the conceptual representations BROWN∩TRIANGLE and 
BLACK∩SQUARE, respectively. Further, she knows the 
truth-conditional impact of the corresponding constituents. 
And she should be able to extract the lexicon entries brown 
Æ BROWN, black Æ BLACK, triangle Æ TRIANGLE, 
square Æ SQUARE. Using these entries and again the 
principle of compositionality, our agent is able to calculate 
the corresponding conceptual representations for brown 
square and black triangle. Moreover, she is able to 
calculate the truth-conditional impact of the corresponding 
conceptual representation using her knowledge about the 
truth-conditional impact of the conceptual constituents and 
the logical operation ∩. Hence, sharing the made 
assumptions, Fodor & Pylyshyn are right in assuming that 
classical architecture allows to derive the semantic 
systematicity of adjectival modification. 
Quine and Lahav on Adjectival Modification 
'Which parts of a apple have to be red in order to call it a 
red apple?' Obviously, an apple with yellow peel and red 
pulp doesn't count as a red apple under normal 
circumstances. Hence, the crucial insight is that the truth-
conditional content determining what counts as a red apple  
is depending on selecting the proper parts of color 
assignment. For example, the truth conditions for being a 
red apple conforms to modifying the PEEL-PART of an 
apple (and not, saying, the PULP-PART).  
 In the previous section we have assumed that a big class 
of adjectives behaves intersectively.  Now we see that this 
                                                 
3 We use capitals for names of concepts and we use italics for the 
investigated natural language expressions (as in 'the noun square relates 
to the concept SQUARE which  denotes the set of squares'). 
 
4 This surely is the case for color concepts such as BROWN and form 
concepts such as TRIANGLE which correspond to perceptual classifiers. 
The same holds for a variety of other concepts that relate to a restricted 
class of predicates and relations (defined over a domain of objects, events, 
etc.) 
 
claim doesn't hold strictly. It appears valid only if we 
restrict the class of nouns considerably and consider nouns 
only that designate objects with a pure meronomy.5 In 
general, however, all adjectives that are commonly 
considered as 'absolute' do not behave intersectively and 
show a dependence upon the objects class instead (like 
graded adjectives such as big and tall). Quine (1960) was 
the first who noted the contrast between red apple (red on 
the outside) and pink grapefruit (pink on the inside). In a 
similar vein, Lahav (1993) argues that an adjective such as 
brown doesn’t make a simple and fixed contribution to any 
composite expression in which it appears:  
In order for a cow to be brown most of its body’s 
surface should be brown, though not its udders, eyes, 
or internal organs. A brown crystal, on the other hand, 
needs to be brown both inside and outside. A brown 
book is brown if its cover, but not necessarily its inner 
pages, are mostly brown, while a newspaper is brown 
only if all its pages are brown. For a potato to be 
brown it needs to be brown only outside, ... (Lahav 
1993: 76). 
There are three consequences of this observation. First, we 
can no longer assume intersectivity, and Fodor & 
Pylyshyn's compositional analysis breaks down in the case 
under discussion.  Second, we are not able to derive 
systematicity statements as (2) from the classical assumpt-
ions, since the intersection operation isn't applicable.  
(2) When an agent understands the expressions red apple 
(RED PEEL) and sweet grapefruit (SWEET PULP), then 
it's likely that she understands the expressions red 
grapefruit (RED PULP) and sweet apple (SWEET 
PULP) as well.  
Third, we conclude that encyclopedic knowledge is 
required to determine the truth conditional content of an 
utterance.6 Possibly, the interaction of linguistic and 
encyclopedic knowledge may allow us to derive 
systematicity clauses as given in (2) – supposed the 
required knowledge about apples and grapefruits is 
available. 
Prototypes and Adjectival Modification  
Before we start to present our proposal for deriving 
systematicity we should mention two related problems that 
                                                 
5 Two-dimensional mathematical objects such as squares and triangles 
seem to be of this type: they have a very poor meronomic structure. But 
even in these cases, adjectives do not always behave intersectively.  
Bosch (2002) presents an example of a triangle that has black edges and is 
white inside. It is possible to refer to this triangle as a white triangle in the 
context of an entirely black triangle and an entirely blue triangle, but as a  
black triangle in the context of a white triangle with red edges and a white 
triangle with blue edges. 
 
6 This point is generalized and carefully worked out in Relevance Theory  
(cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986). In this theory the notion of explicature is 
used in order to fill the gap between formal, linguistic meaning and the 
propositional content (i.e., the explicit assumptions communicated by an 
utterance). 
concern adjectival modification. The first problem goes 
back to Quine (1960) who noted the different colors 
denoted by red in red apple and red hair. A related 
observation is that the same color sometimes gets 
expressed in different ways, depending on what it contrasts 
with. For example, in Japanese, aka-zatoo 'brown sugar' 
(lit. 'red sugar') comes in the same range of colors as shira-
miso, lit. 'white bean paste'. This replicates the earlier 
finding that adjectives as red don't behave as one-placed 
predicates that modify by conjoining with the noun's 
denotation. Hence, they  don't make a simple and fixed 
contribution to any composite expression in which they 
appear. Instead, the actual color value deviates in a 
systematic way from the prototypical color value that can 
be assigned to the color adjective in isolation – in 
dependency on the conceptual properties of the modified 
noun.  
 The second problem concerns the typicality effects in 
adjective-noun combinations (e.g. Osherson & Smith, 
1981; Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988). Most 
importantly, we have to account for the "conjunction 
effect" in this connection. To illustrate the effect consider 
the typicality of a particular red apple as an instance of the 
concepts APPLE and RED APPLE. The typical finding is 
that our red apple is judged more typical of RED APPLE 
than of APPLE. In case of "incompatible conjunctions" 
such as striped apple or brown apple the conjunction effect 
is greater than in "compatible conjunctions".  Though the 
second problem doesn't relate to the truth-conditional 
impact of adjectival modification, we think a good model 
should account both for the truth-conditional peculiarities 
of adjectival modification and for the typicality effects.  
Compositionality without Systematicity 
There are at least two different theoretical possibilities to 
deal with the problems of adjectival modification. The first 
proposal conforms to the view of radical 
underspecification augmented with contextual enrichment 
(e.g. Blutner, 1998). In this view, every lexical unit 
determines an underspecified representation. The 
combinatorial system determines how lexical units are 
combined into larger units. Finally, there is a mechanism 
of contextual enrichment (pragmatic strengthening based 
on contextual and encyclopedic knowledge) which is 
controlled by factors of economy. As an example, we can 
take the meaning of the adjective long as λx LONG(x,X), 
denoting the class of objects that are long with regard to a 
comparison class which is indicated by the free variable X.  
 In a similar way we could introduce free variables 
addressing the different parts of an object that may be 
affected by the modifying adjective. However, this view 
leads to rather clumsy lexical entries. Worse, this theory 
does not really clarify how the border line between the 
underspecified representation and the contextual 
enrichment is ever to be determined7, and it is difficult to 
                                                 
7 cf. Blutner, Hendriks, & de Hoop (2003) 
see how the available mechanisms account for the 
prototype effects found in adjectival modification. 
 The second proposal takes Montague (1970) as its 
starting-point and considers the attributive use of 
adjectives as fundamental and accordingly does not treat 
adjectives as predicates, but rather as adnominal functors. 
Such functors turn the properties expressed by the noun 
into those expressed by the (adjective noun)N combination: 
(adj noun)N Æ ADJ'(NOUN'). To give an example, the 
functor associated with red may be defined disjunctively in 
the manner illustrated in (3):  
(3) RED(X) means roughly the property 
(a) of having a red inner volume if X denotes fruits 
only the inside of which is edible 
(b) of having a red surface if X denotes fruits with 
edible outside 
(c) of having a functional part that is red if X denotes 
tools 
 ... 
The question now is: can we derive the intended 
systematicity clauses if we realize compositionality via 
adnominal functors. The answer is negative in the general 
case. Let's consider an example and assume our agent 
understands the phrase red apple. That means she is able to 
grasp the corresponding conceptual representation 
RED(APPLE), and, in order to determine the truth-
functional impact she should also be able to calculate the 
value of the function RED for the argument APPLE. We 
assume the results is a COLOR attribute that is specifying 
the apple's PEEL-PART. Similarly, if our agent understands 
sweet grapefruit he grasps the conceptual representation 
SWEET(GRAPEFRUIT), and the value of the function 
SWEET for the argument GRAPEFRUIT is such that it 
specifies its PULP-PART.   
 The question now is, can we derive from these premises 
that our agent is able to determine the truth conditional 
impact for, let's say, red grapefruit. Compositionality may 
help her to determine the conceptual representation, 
RED(GRAPEFRUIT). But this is not enough information to 
determine the relevant truth-condition. She must also be 
able to calculate the value of the function RED for the 
argument GRAPEFRUIT. This value cannot be extrapolated 
from the value of the function RED for the argument 
APPLE. The intended solution is that this value 
corresponds to specifying the PULP-PART in case of our 
red grapefruit. However, the classical theory cannot 
explain it. Consequently, it cannot derive the systematicity 
clause given in (2). 
 The general conclusion is that compositionality is often 
very simple to realize if (higher order) functions are 
introduced. In many cases, this tool realizes generalizat-
ions to the worst case (cf. the appendix in Jannsen 1997). 
Unfortunately, we cannot derive interesting systematicity 
clauses from this style of compositionality. The fixing of 
the functions for different values doesn't determine the 
complete functions without further information.  
 The previous discussion made clear that some kind of 
encyclopedic knowledge is required in order to fill in the 
systematicity gap. Using a Bayesian picture of the mental 
Form Taste Color 
Adjective Noun
Conceptual Layer 
encyclopedia it is plausible that at least certain default 
clauses of systematicity are derivable, which can be 
overwritten if more experience comes in.  
 Towards a Theory of Adjectival Modification 
In this section we sketch a connectionist approach of 
overcoming the gap between compositionality and system-
aticity. It's our aim not only to model the truth-functional 
aspects of adjectival modification but likewise the 
typicality effects. On the first look, our model can be seen 
as a connectionist variant of the selective modification 
model of Smith et al. (1988). It shares with this model the 
(localist) attribute-value representation for the prototypes 
(apple, grapefruit, …) and for the relevant instances.  
 The architecture of a simplified variant of our model 
(not yet differentiating the parts of an object), is given in 
Figure 1. The activation values for the nodes at the 
conceptual layer conform to the numerical values assigned 

















Figure 1: Architecture of a connectionist selective 
modification model (simplified). Inhibitory  
connections within the lower level aren't shown. 
 
The upper layer of the model realizes localist representat-
ions of the adjectives and nouns, respectively (3 color 
adjectives, 3 taste adjectives, 6 nouns designating fruits). 
There are fixed bidirectional connections (maximum 
weight) between the nodes for the adjectives and the 
corresponding conceptual nodes at the lower layer 
(supposing a 1-1 correspondence between the adjectives 
and their localist attribute-value designations). The 
connection strength between the conceptual layer and the 
noun layer are learned using standard techniques of 
learning prototypes from exemplars (cf. McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1988). For this purpose a representative sample 
of particular fruit exemplars was generated.  
 Though it's not possible here to give a detailed 
comparison between the connectionist modification model 
and the Smith et al. model, it should be mentioned that the 
basic findings are rather similar. Using Tversky's (1977) 
contrast rule (formulated for activation vectors)  
(4) sim(s,t) = α∑i min(si,ti) − β∑i |si−ti| 
we are able to demonstrate the conjunction effect. Take 
sapple as realizing the activation vector for the conceptual 
layer supposing the noun apple is the input to the word 
layer, and take sred apple as realizing the activation vector for 
the conceptual layer supposing the combination red apple 
inputs to the word layer. Further, let t1 designate the 
activation vector for an instance of an red apple. Then our 
model correctly predicts the conjunction effect:  
(5) sim(sred apple, t1) > sim(sapple, t1)  
Moreover, we are able to account for the fact that the 
conjunction effect is greater in incompatible conjunctions 
than in compatible conjunctions (with t2 an instance of a 
brown apple): 
(6) sim(sbrown apple,t2)−sim(sapple,t2) >  
sim(sred apple,t1)−sim(s apple,t1) 
In the next step of modeling we extend the model by 
distinguish different parts of the fruits (inside and outside). 
Since without  further learning the model starts with a 
uniform weight matrix, the 'neutral' force of modification 
affects all parts uniformly. After learning, that the color of 
the outside of fruits is more discriminating than the color 
of its inside the learning mechanism correctly reproduces 
the expected sort of modification. Hence, the model 
behaves analoguous to Zwarts' (2003) "strongest meaning" 
model which starts with an initial default hypothesis which 
is subsequentially modified if more encyclopedic 
knowledge comes in. Concluding, we are able to derive 
systematicity clauses by making use of a connectionist 
modeling of the (raise of) encyclopedic knowledge. 
 Presently, we're working out a distributed version of the 
model making use of  trichromatic representation of color 
and solving the arising binding problem by using tensor 
products. This extension will allow us to address more 
realistic data concerning the colors found in adjective noun 
combinations. 
 Finally, we want to stress that the present  model is not 
intended to cover all aspects of compositionality and all 
aspects of systematicity. However, we think that the 
present discussion may help to understand (a) that 
compositionality per se is not a very restrictive empirical 
principle, (b) that systematicity of meaning has much to do 
with acquiring encyclopedic knowledge. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the principle of compositionality of meaning 
may be interesting − not as part of cognitive architecture, 
but as a consequence of evolutionary learning (e.g. Kirby, 
2000). However, this is another story. 
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